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Asset protection planning has gained in popularity and
acceptance among estate planners over the past two decades,
and is now a headline topic at national legal conferences and a
featured subject in law school curricula. While the self-settled
*
Inga Ivsan is a Vice President and Chief Marketing Officer for a Swiss-based
financial services group that includes international trust companies, insurance
management firms, and a wealth advisory organization registered with the U.S. Securities
& Exchange Commission to provide services to U.S. clients. In this capacity, Ms. Ivsan
supervises a global program of professional education and client outreach events.
For many years, Ms. Ivsan served as a Trust Manager in the Swiss headquarters of
an international trust company. She has extensive experience with Swiss banking
institutions that provide services to trust and LLC clients.
Ms. Ivsan holds a Juris Doctor cum laude and Master of Laws in Estate Planning
from the University of Miami School of Law. She is also the manager of Swiss Private
Wealth Advisors, LLC, a U.S.-based company that provides liaison services for lawyers
seeking to procure international trust, LLC, family office, and insurance management
services on behalf of their clients.
**
Swiss Private Wealth Advisors, LLC was established by a team of wealth
management professionals with two decades of experience serving the offshore financial
services industry. They are recognized leaders in the field of international asset
protection.
In addition to authoring LLC and trust legislation in several jurisdictions, members
of their staff helped develop some of the leading professional education conferences
centered on asset protection and offshore planning. The company is pleased to represent
offshore service providers at some of the nation’s leading conferences for estate planners,
accountants, and insurance and wealth management professionals.

135

136

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:135

spendthrift trust was once considered the domain of a handful of
offshore jurisdictions, sixteen American states have now enacted
legislation to facilitate such planning closer to home.
This article examines the historical challenges and
contemporary threats to asset protection planning, including:
Past use of the contempt powers of the courts to compel debtors
to repatriate assets held offshore; tort liability for civil
conspiracy and civil RICO claims; attorney liability and ethical
considerations; and the distinction between “fraudulent
transfers” and “fraud.” Recent cases point to the emergence of
a new doctrine – the per se fraudulent transfer rule – affecting
asset protection planning even in those states that recognize selfsettled spendthrift trusts.
Transitioning away from asset
protection trusts to more modern, cutting-edge techniques –
including captive insurance and LLCs – enable lawyers to offer
a broader spectrum of solutions and better secure client assets
from creditor threat.
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I.

INTRODUCTION AND UNANTICIPATED POLICY
ARGUMENTS

Society instinctively fears what it does not understand. Asset
protection is tinted with adverse connotations and fears of the unknown.
Asset protection planning could be likened to tax planning: A field
fraught with its own perks and pitfalls. Like tax planning that follows the
guidelines of available tax authorities, asset protection planning that
abides by the governing authorities on fraudulent transfers generally
works. By contrast, antagonistic asset protection planning may be
compared to antagonistic tax planning, which is likely to land both the
client and the attorney in hot water.
Popular media, combined with the outcomes of a handful of cases
featuring notoriously bad facts,1 feed a fallacy that needs to be
elucidated: Asset protection remains a legitimate and requisite device in
individual estate planning when conducted within the boundaries of the
law. Affirming this viewpoint, 16 states2 have enacted domestic asset
protection trust (“DAPT”) laws to enhance certainty in this particular
area of planning.3
This article reexamines historical challenges to asset protection
planning and concludes that the emerging trend does not look auspicious
for straightforward asset protection. If the primary reasoning for the
structure is to achieve asset protection benefits, states like California will
likely find the structure to be a per se fraudulent transfer. Even in those
states that do not follow the California rule, courts are inclined to
disfavor a structure created for asset protection reasons. One should look
1

See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Affordable Media, LLC 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir.
1999) (where the Andersons ran a Ponzi scheme through their late-night telemarketing
business and placed the money into a Cook Islands trust which was later challenged by
the FTC).
2
Hawaii, Nevada, Missouri, New Hampshire, Alaska, Delaware, Oklahoma, Ohio,
Rhode Island, Utah, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Wyoming, West Virginia and
Mississippi. 7th Annual Domestic Asset Protection Trust State Rankings Chart, http://osh
ins.com/images/DAPT_Rankings.pdf.
3
State-approved DAPT laws override common United States public policy, as it was
explained in the Restatement, and allow a settlor to form a trust benefitting himself to
afford him with protection from future creditors. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 156(2) (1959).
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ahead by considering the rationale of the ruling in Kilker v. Stillman4 and
the Section 548(e)(1) clawback rule of the Bankruptcy Code; these are
the early warning signs as to what may come to be a majority approach
in the future.5
“[E]ffective people are not problem-minded; they’re opportunityminded. They feed opportunities and starve problems. They think
preventively.”6 Attorneys seeking to push back against this trend may
have to look outside the traditional planning models of asset protection
trusts and consider other approaches that do not signify an inherent asset
protection motive. Captive insurance offers perhaps the most effective
way for an operating business to realize profits inside an asset protective
structure, while facilitating important estate planning goals at the same
time. LLCs and foreign investment funds also offer a variety of indirect
asset protection benefits while serving primarily business objectives.
This article seeks to consider the less publicized and yet to be
articulated arguments in favor of asset protection planning. From a social
policy standpoint, one may argue that, by deterring attorneys and clients
from engaging in asset protection planning, the United States legal
system emboldens economic waste. Spending one’s money and
becoming a debtor entails little consequence, whereas those who choose
to preserve wealth through an asset protection trust face potential liability
for years afterward.
From an economic standpoint, discouraging wealth preservation
reflexively incites imprudent lending, conceivably leading to another
market bubble. The last recession revealed the awesome scope of greedy
creditors and slippery lenders who offered zero-down financing and “no
document” mortgages to those with insufficient credit. Yet, when the
bubble burst, creditors leaned on a legal bias built into the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”) and state court judges, who
instinctively side with creditors at the expense of debtors. The UFTA, a
set of uniform fraudulent transfer laws enacted in almost every state,
provides a defined set of legal remedies to creditors. Among other things,
a creditor may ask a court to set aside a fraudulent transfer under the
UFTA, awarding the transferred property to the creditor instead of the
debtor.
Moreover, the debtor historically has had a choice between
preserving wealth and spending it, and public policy should not
discourage the frugal in favor of the reckless. An individual should be
allowed to spend his after-tax money notwithstanding the remote
4

Kilker v. Stillman, 2012 WL 5902348 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2012) (unpublished).
11 U.S.C.A. § 548(e)(1) (2012).
6
STEPHEN R. COVEY, THE 7 HABITS OF HIGHLY EFFECTIVE PEOPLE: RESTORING THE
CHARACTER ETHIC 154 (2004) (paraphrasing Peter Drucker).
5
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possibility that one day a future creditor might come calling. Individuals
should not be expected to compromise their estate plans and leave their
life savings forever exposed to satisfy the claims of unknown and
unanticipated creditors. Individuals who responsibly insure their home,
automobiles, health, and wealth should not be any less worthy of legal
protection than those who spend their earnings into oblivion.
The bias in the legal system, which favors creditors, creates a moral
hazard in which creditors are immunized from their own poor decisions.
It denies the lending industry the opportunity to learn from experience.
Instead of requiring the creditor to bear the costs of bad loan decisions,
policy judgments underlying the UFTA and state court rulings on
fraudulent transfers instead shift the costs of credit to the community at
large through clogged court dockets. Taxpayers are forced to incur,
among other things, the high cost of incarcerating debtors, even though
such incarcerations are blatantly illegal, because creditors hoodwink state
court judges into thinking that contempt of court is a legitimate means to
compel payment of a debt.
Social responsibility is likewise harmed by penalizing risk-averse
behavior such as asset protection planning for those who seek to preserve
their wealth when no liabilities are present or foreseeable. The layered
complexity surrounding asset protection cannot be easily covered in a
single article. However, this article will attempt to tackle the emerging
issues through “simplicity without reduction”7 and offer the
unanticipated and less often publicized arguments in light of recent cases
that seek to curb asset protection planning.

A.

Asset Protection Defined

“Asset protection,” first and foremost, serves to preserve wealth by
erecting barriers between a creditor and one’s assets. Asset protection
planning advances on the basis of two guiding principles: First, the
manner in which assets are titled generally defines the scope of creditor
remedies and judicial discourse governing claims to such assets;8 second,
a creditor entitled to collect on a judgment may only reach those assets in
existence at the time of collection – the creditor cannot reach back in
time to attach assets that are no longer owned by the debtor.
7

Göran Broman, John Holmberg & Karl-Henrik Roboèrt, Simplicity Without
Reduction: Thinking Upstream Towards the Sustainable Society, 30 INTERFACES. 15
(2000) (stating “[A]nalysis begins at a level where complexity is naturally low, rather
than at a level of detail where links to the principles of the system can be vague
and difficult to discern. We use the simplicity-without-reduction method out of respect
for complexity, in contrast to the common method of ignoring parts of reality to
(seemingly) reduce complexity.”).
8
BARRY S. ENGEL, ASSET PROTECTION PLANNING GUIDE 115-125.06 (3rd ed. 2013).
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Traditional asset protection planning first looks to utilize the
exemptions and protections available under domestic law, such as
homestead, ownership by entirety, and retirement accounts.9 After
exhausting all available exemptions, asset protection seeks to protect the
remaining assets by utilizing legal structures that typically entail the
severing of legal ownership from beneficial ownership.10 Asset
protection planning is consistent with the freedom to dispose of one’s
property as one wishes, which is deeply rooted in American history and
law.11 For example, “New York law recognizes the right of individuals to
arrange their affairs so as to limit their liability to creditors . . . .”12 This
is also consistent with Judge Learned Hand’s renowned view that every
person has the right to organize his endeavors to decrease his taxes.13
Asset protection, especially when accomplished offshore, has been
equated with “hiding assets” and “immoral” or “illegal” activity.14
Contrary to popular perception, however, asset protection planning tends
to be a fairly transparent process, due in no small part to provisions
requiring that ownership of foreign trusts, business entities, and bank

9

Id. at 155.
Id.
11
“All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable
rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking
and obtaining their safety and happiness.” Mass. CONST. art. 1; see also FRANKLIN B.
HOUGH, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: COMPRISING THE CONSTITUTION OF EACH STATE IN
THE UNION, AND OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION; EACH ACCOMPANIED BY A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION AND
NOTES, TOGETHER WITH A CLASSIFIED ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONS, ACCORDING TO
THEIR SUBJECTS, SHOWING, BY COMPARATIVE ARRANGEMENT, EVERY CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION NOW IN FORCE IN THE SEVERAL STATES; WITH REFERENCES TO JUDICIAL
DECISIONS, AND AN ANALYTICAL INDEX. ILLUSTRATED BY CAREFULLY ENGRAVED FACSIMILES OF THE GREAT SEALS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND OF EACH STATE AND
TERRITORY 576 (2d vol. 1872).
12
In re Joseph Heller Inter Vivos Trust, 161 Misc. 2d 369, 370 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1994);
see e.g. Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Lopez, 531 So.2d 946 (Fla. 1988) (noting
that Florida recognizes the homestead exemption to preserve wealth); see also First Nat’l
Bank of Leesburg v. Hector Supply Co., 254 So.2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1971) (noting that
Florida recognizes asset protection when real estate is owned as tenants by the entirety).
13
“Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging
one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all
do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are
enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals
is mere cant.” Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d
Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting).
14
See Engel, supra note 8 at 176.02-175.03.
10

2015-2016]

EMERGING CHALLENGES

141

accounts be reported to the IRS on an annual basis.15 In reality, modern
asset protection planning is not about hiding assets; it is a foreseeable
response to a liberal legal system that entertains frivolous litigation as
much as it is an unanticipated reaction to irresponsible creditors who
imprudently lend funds to unqualified borrowers on an insufficiently
collateralized basis.
When properly implemented, asset protection planning enhances
one’s ability to fend off claims.16 In this sense, one may analogize asset
protection with an indispensable form of insurance for one’s wealth, with
a deductible measured by the settlement value of the creditor’s claim.
Thus, those who are risk-averse and seek to preserve their wealth may
stand the greatest chance of benefiting from asset protection planning, as
if obtaining a liability insurance policy.

B.

Asset Protection Using Trusts

Asset protection planning is synonymous with the use of trusts. The
underlying purpose of a trust is to give someone else—a trustee—assets
to be held for the benefit of others. A self-settled spendthrift trust is the
prevailing solution where a settlor, the owner of the assets, transfers legal
ownership to a trustee but still enjoys the benefit of the assets.17 Notably,
a self-settled spendthrift trust is a trust in which the settlor is also the
beneficiary under a spendthrift clause.18 Historically, state courts have
not permitted settlors to place their assets beyond the reach of creditors
and enjoy the protection of a spendthrift clause, considering the selfsettled spendthrift trust to be void against public policy.19 The only trusts
that were recognized were traditional trusts, where the beneficiary and
settlor were not the same person.20 Traditionally, the use of a trust
allowed individuals to avoid probate and prevent direct access to the
assets by beneficiaries. 21 Due to the enactment of recent laws in DAPT
15

Laura Sanders, Offshore Accounts: No Place to Hide?, WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Sept. 20, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873248077045790
85511331606786.
16
See Engel, supra note 8 at 135-145.
17
Id. at 901.03.
18
BNA Portfolio 810-3rd, Asset Protection Planning, pp. A-51.
19
Id. at 901.04.
20
Id.
21
See generally STEPHEN J. CHOI, THE UNFOUNDED FEAR OF REGULATION S: EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE ON OFFSHORE SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 50 DUKE L. J. 663, 665 (2000).; A wellknown historian, who focused on the study of English law, has notably said: “The idea of
a trust is so familiar to us all that we never wonder at it. And yet surely we ought to
wonder.” Id. In England, during the Middle Ages, landowners devised the “use,” a
planning device that evolved with time into present-day trusts. Id. The donor was named
a “feoffee to uses,” and the intended beneficiary of the use was named a “cestui que use.”
Id. The beneficiary was allowed to take the profits and to convey per the instructions of
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states and offshore jurisdictions, a settlor now can establish a self-settling
spendthrift trust, name himself a beneficiary, and achieve wealth
preservation. Most offshore jurisdictions and DAPT states acknowledge
the necessity of having a spendthrift clause that would disallow the
beneficiaries under duress from any future creditor re-assigning their
interest.22
Attorney, first began to create self-settled spendthrift trusts as an
asset protection device by seeking out jurisdictions where transfers in
trust were likely to be shielded from creditor claims. The Isle of Man
became a focal point for this type of planning after the 1859 ruling
in Corlett v. Radcliffe, where the court found that fraudulent transfer
claims must be handled with an ad hoc approach.23 There, the Manx
court upheld the trust where the settlor was solvent at the time the trust
was funded and declined to set aside transfers in trust as fraudulent
against future unanticipated creditors.24 This principle was reinforced
over 100 years later in In re Heginbotham, a 1999 decision sustaining
transfers by a solvent settlor to a trust; at the time of trust funding, there
were no reasonably foreseeable creditors, even though the settlor
subsequently became insolvent.25 As Winston Churchill stated “[T]he
farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.”26

the feoffee. Id. Henry VII ratified the statute of uses to offset the adverse revenue
consequences incurred by the popularity of the use, attaching ownership of legal title to
the beneficiaries of the use to hold them liable for taxes. Id. Yet, the statute of uses
provided some exceptions from taxation, such as where an feoffee held some form of
ownership in “active trust,” which led to the formation of the modern-day English trust.
Id. Generations later, the United States Supreme Court equated the use and trust. Id.
22
Engel, supra note 8 at 915.01.
23
See Corlette v. Radcliffe, 14 Moo PCC 121, 15 ER 251 (1859) (Isle of Man).
24
Id.
25
Re The Petition Of Christopher Jollian Heginbotham, 2 ITELR 95 (1999) (Isle of
Man).
26
Margaret Brown, Lost in Abbreviated History, TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION (Aug. 7,
2014), http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/comment/letters/lost-in-abbreviated-histor
y/2015018.article.
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Indeed, several countries27 have enacted trust laws meant to codify
certain common law principles originating from the Isle of Man.28
Some countries have also enacted additional provisions to deter
creditors and offer more protection for trusts registered in their particular
jurisdictions.29 For example, Belize offers immediate protection for
transfers in trust, eliminating the applicability of fraudulent transfer law
altogether.30 Belize eliminated the concept of “badges of fraud” and any
evaluation of the intent behind transfers in trust after consulting attorneys
in England and the United States during the drafting of its asset
protection laws.31 Fraudulent transfer claims are disallowed against a
Belize trustee, thus offering the ultimate asset protection.
Consequentially, an irrevocable offshore trust is perhaps the most
effective vehicle that affords ultimate asset protection: the owner
irreversibly and permanently transfers the legal ownership of the assets
to a trust and, after naming himself a beneficiary, as in a self-settling
spendthrift trust, is able to enjoy the use of the property or assets under
the supervision and discretion of a trustee, preferably residing in a
foreign jurisdiction.32

C.

Codification of Modern Asset Protection Trust Law

Following the success of offshore asset protection trusts, sixteen
DAPT states33 have enacted laws permitting and recognizing some form
of self-settled spendthrift trust.34 An extensive list of assets can be
preserved via asset protection planning, including business interests, a
professional practice, stocks, cash, real property, and most other forms of
wealth. Non-DAPT states still permit creditors to reach assets of a selfsettled spendthrift trust to fulfill judgments against the settlor “on the
basis that the ‘door to trust assets’ remains open as a self-settled
27

The Cook Islands passed laws codifying asset protection in 1989 to its International
Trusts Act. Highlights of the law include recognition of self-settled spendthrift trusts, a
shortened statute of limitations for fraudulent transfers, and a requirement that the credit
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the debtor acted with the requisite intent to
establish a fraudulent transfer. In 1992, Belize enacted asset protection trust laws utilizing
a slightly-different approach. In 1996, Nevis followed the Cook Islands and Belize by
enacting its own asset protection law. Its laws duplicated to a large extent the laws
enacted by the Cook Islands. Nevis legislation added another protective layer by
requiring that a creditor post a bond of approximately USD 13,000 to file a complaint
against a Nevis trustee. See BELIZE TRUSTS ACT, ch. 202 (2000).
28
See, e.g., Cook Islands, Belize, and Nevis.
29
See generally BELIZE TRUSTS ACT, ch. 202 (2000).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Engel, supra note 8 at 1020.01.
33
Supra note 2.
34
Engel, supra note 8 at 945.
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spendthrift trust; a judgment creditor would not need to [revert] the
parties to their original position.”35 In non-DAPT states, if a settlor
assigns a beneficiary other than himself, such a spendthrift trust would be
afforded protection from creditors unlike a self-settled spendthrift trust,
where the settlor and beneficiary are the same individual.36 However, as
seen in Castellano, the creditors of a beneficiary, which are not the same
as the settlor, may still be able to reach the assets of even a traditional
spendthrift trust.37
Until now, the absence of case law affirming the viability of
domestic asset protection trusts have led most attorneys to recommend
that their clients engage in asset protection planning primarily through
offshore jurisdictions. The efficacy of asset protection planning should
best be judged by its outcome. To date, the available case law suggests
that ultimately no domestic self-settled spendthrift trust would be able to
protect the trust assets,38 although a domestic trust could theoretically
work where the trustee, the debtor, and the creditor all reside in a state
that recognizes domestic asset protection trusts.39 However, that is an
extremely narrow exception and, for the residents of the 34 states that
have not enacted explicit DAPT statutes, offshore planning is arguably
the only way to go. Moreover, offshore asset protection trust jurisdictions
are governed by their own laws and do not always recognize other
countries’ judgments unlike states, which are subject to enforce each
other’s judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.40
Many offshore jurisdictions offer user-friendly asset protection laws,
and creditors are often unable to reach the trust assets.41 Domestic
creditors face more complicated and costly paths to go to the foreign
35

Id. at 945-945.02.
Id. at 901.04.
37
In re Castellano, 514 B.R. 555, 557-58 (Bankr. N. D. Ill. 2014). The trust in
Castellano was established by the settlor in 1997 for the benefit of her four children. To
protect the trust assets from any one child’s creditors, the settlor had thoughtfully
included a conventional spendthrift clause before her death. The court was unmoved by
the fact that the debtor had not settled a trust. The resulting arrangement was, in the eyes
of the court, identical to a self-settled trust arrangement. Thus, Ms. Castellano’s creditors
found themselves the recipients of a $400,000 windfall never intended to have gone to
Ms. Castellano for the benefit of her creditors in the first place.
38
Steven J. Oshins, The Domestic Asset Protection Trust: Combining It with the
Double LLC Strategy, American Bar Association Section of Real Property Trust & Estate
Law (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/probate_property_ma
gazine_2012/2013/january_february_2013/article_oshins_domestic_asset_protection_trus
t.html.
39
A court in a non-DAPT state may choose to disregard a DAPT created in a state
other than the grantor’s state of residence. See In re Huber, 493 B.R. 798, (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 2013).
40
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
41
Supra note 29.
36
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jurisdiction and hope for a favorable local court order.42 The offshore
asset protection trust serves as a filter, deterring frivolous claims and
requiring that the creditor be resourceful and committed before gaining
access to the foreign courthouse. Asset protection trusts established
under the laws of offshore jurisdictions, such as Belize or Nevis,
effectively deter unreasonable and unfounded creditors and reduce the
profile of the debtor as a desirable deep-pocketed target.43

II.

HISTORIC CHALLENGES TO ASSET PROTECTION
TRUSTS

Asset protection historically has been critiqued and scrutinized by a
society that is unsympathetic to debtors’ unwillingness or inability to pay
creditors. The unremitting struggle between these two competing
interests—those who may have a claim and those who have a right to
dispose of their property as they wish—evades easy solutions. Both
parties have rights which they can exercise within certain prescribed
boundaries.44 A person of means should not be condemned for seeking to
preserve wealth any more than the unanticipated creditor pursuing a
speculative claim. Each is acting within the scope of his own rights.
Asset protection is a reaction to a system that is often too liberal for
not only tolerating meritless claims but also awarding extreme punitive
damages.45 However, the law holds a bias against those who dare guard
their assets; uniform fraudulent transfer laws, which are found in 44
states and the District of Columbia, tilt the scales in favor of a creditor by
affording special remedies where assets are transferred in an effort to
defeat collection.46 Judges reinforce this bias with contempt orders,
incarcerating debtors for having created their own impossibility to pay,
essentially bringing back the much scorned “debtors prisons” of old
England.47 Attorneys assisting with asset protection planning are also

42

Engel, supra note 8 at 1020.06.
See Donald F Conway v. Queensway Trustees Limited (Civ. App. No. 11 April 3,
2000) (St. Kitts & Nevis).
44
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors 46 (5th ed. 2006).
45
Lauren Pearle, ‘I’m Being Sued For WHAT?’, ABC NEWS (May 2, 2007), http://abc
news.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3121086&page=1.
46
Legislative Fact Sheet—Fraudulent Transfer Act—now known as Voidable
Transactions Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Legislative
FactSheet.aspx?title=Fraudulent%20Transfer%20Act%20-%20now%20known%20as%2
0Voidable%20Transactions%20Act.
47
Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 2013 WL 6223564, *9 (Minn. App.,
Dec. 2, 2013).
43
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being subjected to expanding scrutiny and experimental theories of
liability, such as RICO, civil conspiracy, and common law fraud. 48

A.
Fraudulent Transfers and Common Misconceptions of the
UFTA’s Purpose
The primary remedy, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”),
for the creditors is also the source of common confusion and
inconsistency among the courts due to its implied reference to fraud.49
However, the UFTA is a legal remedy, a reversal of a transfer, and not
necessarily a sign of fraud. The concept of “fraudulent transfer” of
property originated from the English Statute of Elizabeth of 1571,
otherwise known as the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 157150 The Statute
was enacted to combat fraudulent deeds, alienation, and other transfers
made before an individual became insolvent.51 Creditors were granted a
special remedy through which the courts could void the conveyance of
real property or chattels if the debtor was found to have acted with the
intent of obstructing or defrauding creditors.52 Notably, the Statute of
Elizabeth had no statute of limitation, meaning that a debtor transferring
assets at any time could potentially see the transfer set aside far into the
future by a creditor who did not exist at the time the transfer was first
made.53
Presently, the United States Bankruptcy Code and fraudulent transfer
statutes enacted in most states follow many of the core principles first set
out in the old English statute.54 Most states have implemented the UFTA,
which is concerned with the validity of transfers that leave an owner
insolvent and are intended to defraud creditors.55 Intent can be explicit or
constructive, and there is a list of “badges of fraud” to guide courts in
evaluating the transferor’s intent.56 If a transfer in trust is found to be
fraudulent, the transfer is voidable in the hands of the trust and the
expected protection fails.57
Historically, planning early and setting enough funds aside to avoid
insolvency in the presence of known creditors have been the key
48

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2015).
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”) (2014), available at http://www.unifor
mlaws.org/shared/docs/Fraudulent%20Transfer/2013oct_AUFTA_InterimDraft_MASTE
R%20KCK(2).pdf.
50
13 Eliz 1, c 5.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012).
55
37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers § 4 (2015).
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UFTA supra note 49 at § 4(b).
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Supra note 55.
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guidelines for debtors to not run afoul of the UFTA. Common law fills in
the gaps by clarifying the relevance of “future creditors.”58 For example,
in Klein v. Klein,, the court explained:
[T]here has been found no authority that an action such
as this must fail for the reason that the grantor, who was
without creditors, feared for future dangers, real or
imaginative. Surely his hands were as clean as any one
who ever came into equity. What he did amounted to no
more than insurance against a possible disaster.59
Case law interpreting the UFTA reveals important distinctions
among three classes of creditors: (i) Present creditors, (ii) reasonably
foreseeable future creditors, and (iii) unknown future creditors.60
Historically, those individuals who parted with their assets for the sake of
peace of mind, and facilitated asset protection as a form of insurance,
successfully overcame fraudulent transfer claims when such transfers
were made before both present creditors and reasonably identifiable
foreseeable future creditors, and the transferor retained sufficient assets
so as not to become insolvent.61
But recently, such planning has not been so effective. For example,
in California, the UFTA has been interpreted by at least one court to
invalidate the transfer when assets are transferred years before any
potential creditor was identifiable.62 The California court invalidated a
set of asset protection trusts specifically because, as part of the settlor’s
original intent in establishing the trusts, the settlor sought to preserve his
wealth from the reach of any creditors by utilizing the asset protection
trust laws of Nevada.63
The decision in California may perhaps be best explained as a
combination of judicial bias against debtors unwilling or unable to pay
their debts and a general misconception about fraudulent transfers. The
finding of a fraudulent transfer is technically only a legal remedy that
creditors rely on when pursuing a debtor’s assets, giving the court leeway
to grant a range of remedies in favor of the creditor.64 But because many
courts are not familiar with fraudulent transfer laws, they often
misconstrue fraudulent transfers and equate them with common law

58
59
60
61
62
63
64

See Klein v. Klein, 112 N.Y.S.2d 546 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952).
Id. at 548.
See e.g. Kilker v. Stillman, supra note 4.
See, e.g., Durant v. Durant, 439 A.2d 821 (Pa. 1982).
See, e.g., Kilker, supra note 4 at *5-6.
Id.
See UFTA supra note 49 at §7(c).
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fraud.65 To avoid confusion over the term “fraudulent,” the Uniform Law
Committee has chosen to retitle the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act as
the Uniform Voidable Transfer Act.66

B.

Contempt & Incarceration

In addition to challenges presented by creditors asserting fraudulent
transfers, some courts seek to punish the debtor for creating the
circumstances by which it is impossible for the debtor to repay the
creditor by incarcerating debtors in a modern-day version of debtors’
prison for contempt of court. Civil contempt is defined as an act defying
the justice of the courts and interfering with the administration of
justice.67 It may be punishable by a fine or imprisonment.68 In the context
of asset protection planning, civil contempt is often relevant. Typically,
the debtor establishes an offshore irrevocable trust and permanently
surrenders legal title and control of the assets to an offshore trustee.69
When the creditor tries to enforce a judgment against the debtor, the
creditor will often ask the court to compel the debtor to retrieve the
assets under threat of contempt.70
What usually follows is the defense of impossibility: the debtor is
commanded to bring the assets before the court and yet, the debtor has
ceded ownership and control to someone else.71 A judge may sometimes
issue a court order directing the trust settlor to reverse transfers made in
trust and to remit the trust assets to the court.72 However, because the
debtor does not control the trust, and the laws of the offshore asset
protection trust jurisdiction invariably prohibit the trustee from remitting
trust assets to satisfy creditor claims, the debtor is powerless to affect the
result desired by the court.73 Accordingly, in some instances, trust
settlors have been held in contempt of court and placed in jail.74
65

Engel, supra note 8 at 215.03.
Jay Adkisson, The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act—What’s With The
Name Change?, FORBES (July 18, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2014/0
7/18/the-uniform-voidable-transactions-act-whats-with-the-name-change/#6036c994
8f63.
67
Black’s Law Dictionary 360 (9th ed. 2009).
68
Engel, supra note 8 at 215.03.
69
See, e.g., Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 811 N.W.2d 596, 600
(Minn. 2012).
70
Id. at 599.
71
See id. (inferring that the defendant presented the Impossibility Defense; he should
have not been found in contempt of the Court’s Order to send the assets to the creditor,
because he was in control of those assets and it was literally impossible for him to
comply at that time.).
72
Id. at 598.
73
Id. at 599-600.
74
Id. at 600.
66
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Notwithstanding that settlors of offshore asset protection trusts
sometimes find themselves jailed for contempt of court, the Supreme
Court has ruled that debtors cannot be incarcerated for the mere purpose
of compelling payment of debts.75 In some cases, judges appear to
overlook the fact that the debtor has ceded control of his assets to an
offshore trustee long ago and is powerless to affect their return.76 In other
cases, courts distinguish between (i) impossibility attributable to external
circumstances and (ii) self-created impossibility, with the former serving
as a valid defense to a contempt citation and the latter not.77 Yet, this
distinction between impossibility and self-created impossibility ignores
Supreme Court precedent. A judge should think twice before taking a
debtor’s freedom away when such a delicate distinction between
impossibility and self-created impossibility is the deciding factor.
Impossibility is impossibility, even if self-created for foolish or immoral
purposes. “Impossibilium nulla obligation.”78
At some point, domestic courts should recognize the limits of
jurisdictional authority. Trustees residing in a jurisdiction such as Belize
would never allow assets to be remitted to satisfy a creditor’s claims:
They would not risk the reputation of the jurisdiction as a reliable
location for asset protection trust services by complying with foreign
judgments.
The proper response, in the face of a genuine impossibility defense is
for the domestic court to grant the creditor the requested judgment and to
then encourage the creditor to utilize the procedures of the foreign
jurisdiction in which the trust assets are held. Greater judicial deference
to other countries and their legal systems would empower a domestic
judge to better find that, while the grantor did create the circumstance of
impossibility by transferring assets to a third party, the fact remains that
the debtor is unable to reverse the transfer. Rather than holding the
debtor in contempt and imprisoning the debtor to secure payment of a
debt, an abhorrent practice that was abolished centuries ago, domestic
courts must instead recognize the limits of their authority and the reality
of the legal landscape that confronts the creditor.

75

Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671, (1983) (noting that imprisoning one who,
with no fault of his own, is incapable of paying his debts despite making good faith
efforts, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.).
76
See e.g., Fannie Mae v. Heather Apartments Ltd. P’ship, supra note 47.
77
See e.g., In re Coker, 251 B.R. 902, 905 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000).
78
JAMES T. BRETZKE, CONSECRATED PHRASES: A LATIN THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY;
LATIN EXPRESSIONS COMMONLY FOUND IN THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS 101 (3rd ed. 2013)
(meaning “Nothing impossible can oblige.”).
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One consequence of effective asset protection planning, particularly
offshore, is pressuring creditors to find new avenues for recovery,
including suing those attorneys who engage in asset protection planning
on behalf of their clients. The United States has historically afforded the
freedom to dispose of one’s property, and this right ought to be given
adequate weight when it has been exercised when no identifiable third
party claimants may be affected.79 Moreover, legal counsel, advising
within the boundaries of the law, should not have to fear the legal
consequences of asset protection. Yet, creditors occasionally sue
attorneys, and such lawsuits may have a chilling effect on asset
protection planning.
Attorneys who engage in asset protection planning frequently lean on
Rule 1.2(d) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which states:80
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a
client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or
application of the law.81
Here, “fraud” or “fraudulent” refers to purposeful behavior to
deceive.82 Assisting a client in defrauding known or foreseeable creditors
79

Adler v. Fenton, 65 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1860).
“Our laws determine with accuracy the time and manner in which the
property of a debtor ceases to be subject to his disposition, and
becomes subject to the rights of his creditor. A creditor acquires a
lien upon the lands of his debtor by a judgment; and upon the
personal goods of the debtor, by the delivery of an execution to the
sheriff. It is only by these liens that a creditor has any vested or
specific right in the property of his debtor. Before these liens are
acquired, the debtor has full dominion over his property; he may
convert one species of property into another, and he may alienate to a
purchaser. The rights of the debtor, and those of a creditor, are thus
defined by positive rules; and the points at which the power of the
debtor ceases, and the right of the creditor commences, are clearly
established. These regulations cannot be contravened or varied by
any interposition of equity.”
Id. (quoting Moran v. Dawes, 1 Hopk. Ch. 365, 367 (N.Y. 1825).
80
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2(d) (2002).
81
Id.
82
See The New York Rules of Professional Conduct, 1.0(i) (2011) (“ . . . does not
include conduct that, although characterized as fraudulent by statute or administrative
rule, lacks an element of scienter, deceit, intent to mislead, or knowing failure to correct
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would be fraudulent and a violation of the model rules, and the attorney
would face disciplinary charges for such actions.83 By contrast, asset
protection planning meant to preserve wealth—and not intended to avoid
a known creditor—does not fall within the scope of “fraudulent”
behavior prohibited by the Model Rules.84 In an ironic twist, some
attorneys argue that an attorney could be liable for professional
malpractice if the attorney does not recommend asset protection planning
to clients in need of such planning.85

D.

Civil Conspiracy / Aiding & Abetting

In a desperate effort to overturn the efficacy of asset protection
planning, some creditors have embraced theories of recovery based on
common law tort claims, such as civil conspiracy, or by seeking statutory
remedies originally intended to fight against organized crime.86
These emerging theories of liability may prove to be of limited utility
to creditors.87 Setting aside the merits of any particular claim, as a
general principle of law, it is very difficult for a creditor to hold an
attorney liable for asset protection planning advice. For example, the
majority approach on civil conspiracy, exemplified by Texas and Florida,
is that a fraudulent transfer, without a showing of badges of fraud,
exonerates the asset protection attorney from liability.88 Creditors may
pursue the transferee of the fraudulent transfer but are limited only to the
conveyed assets.89 In Freeman vs. First Union National Bank, the
Supreme Court of Florida made clear the legal distinction between a
“fraudulent transfer” and a “fraud.”90 In a unanimous ruling, the court
found that:
To adopt the [creditor’s] position in this case would be
to expand the [Florida] UFTA beyond its facial
application and in a manner that is outside the purpose
misrepresentations that can be reasonably expected to induce detrimental reliance by
another.”).
83
See Elie v. Smith, 2011 WL 9349985 (Cal. App. Supp. Oct. 13, 2011).
84
See Peter Spero, Asset Protection: Legal Planning, Strategies and Forms § 2.03-6-b
(vol. 1, 2001).
85
Daniel S. Rubin, Asset Protection Planning – Ethical? Legal? Obligatory? 18-1, 1812, Institute of Estate Planning (2014), available at http://www.mosessinger.com/site/file
s/asset_protection_planning_rubin.pdf.
86
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588 (1981).
87
See, e.g., Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 178-79 (1993) (holding that
aiding and abetting claims are not sufficient to satisfy the element that the defendant
operated the enterprise.).
88
See Freeman v. First Union Nat. Bank, 865 So.2d 1272, 1277 (Fla. 2004).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1277.
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and plain language of the statute. Consistent with this
analysis we conclude that [Florida] UFTA was not
intended to serve as a vehicle by which a creditor may
bring a suit against a non-transferee party . . . for
monetary damages arising from the non-transferee
party’s alleged aiding-abetting of a fraudulent money
transfer. Accordingly, we answer the certified question
in the negative and return this case to the Eleventh
Circuit.91
On the other side of the country, California has outlined a minority
view, where attorneys may be liable for civil conspiracy even if they
were not the transferee of the debtor’s assets.92 Unlike the UFTA
implemented in Florida, the UFTA implemented by California is silent
on civil conspiracy when engaging in a fraudulent transfer.93 The
minority approach equates a fraudulent transfer with a tort theory of
fraud; accordingly, the fraudulent transfer forms the element of fraud
needed to bring a cause of action for conspiracy.94 Thus, a fraudulent
transfer can give rise to liability for the asset protection attorney, even if
the attorney is not a transferee of debtor assets.
The differences between the majority and minority approach are
significant, especially when California courts have interpreted the UFTA
to make asset protection planning a per se fraudulent transfer against
future unanticipated creditors.95 Asset protection attorneys in California
may be compelled by the combination of civil liability for fraud based on
a fraudulent transfer and an expansive definition of fraudulent transfers
to rethink the jurisdiction they practice in. Alternatively, attorneys in
California may consider referring asset protection planning clients to
attorneys in one of the fifteen states that has enacted a domestic asset
protection trust law.

91

Id.
See, e.g., Durant Software v. Herman, 255 Cal. Rptr. 250, 256 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989),
reh’g granted, opinion not citeable (Feb. 24, 1989), vacated, 257 Cal. Rptr. 200 (Cal Ct.
App. 1989) review granted and opinion superseded, 775 P.2d 1034 (Cal. 1989) (when
attorneys exceed their role as an advocate and conduct in a intentionally fraudulent way,
that the attorney will not escape liability).
93
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?
section=civ&group=03001-04000&file=3439-3439.14.
94
Courts often mistakenly equate a “fraudulent transfer” with “fraud,” and handle a
fraudulent transfer as a common law fraud. See, e.g. Mack v. Newton, 737 F.2d 1343 (5th
Cir. 1984); Freeman v. First Union Nat’l Bank, supra note 88.
95
See e.g. Kilker v. Stillman, supra note 4.
92
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Civil RICO

The latest strategy to implead attorneys when challenging transfers in
trust is under the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”).96 This potentially overbroad interpretation
of RICO disregards the legislative intent of the Act and may lead to
manipulation by opportunistic plaintiffs and become the case of “be
careful of what you wish for.” This is a more creative cause of action
against the attorney as it surprisingly equates his advocacy of asset
protection with organized mafia activities, which inspired Congress to
enact RICO.97
Even though any person or business damaged under RICO may seek
relief, RICO was enacted to fight organized crime, not to permit a cause
of action in federal courts for any tort claim.98 RICO prohibits any
individual employed by or linked to a qualifying enterprise “‘to conduct
or participate in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern
of racketeering activity . . . .’”99 RICO provides a civil cause of action
against a defendant who acts through or administers an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering.100 To succeed in a civil RICO action, a
plaintiff must establish on the part of the defendant (1) conduct (2) of an
enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity; (5) causing
injury to his ‘business or property.101 The successful claimant is allowed
to recover treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and other expenses under
RICO.102
RICO section 1962(c) proscribes defendants from operating or
managing an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.103 The
term “enterprise” is defined quite broadly as “any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”104 Under such a
broad definition it is conceivable that a law firm, or an attorney, working
in association with a client engaged in asset protection planning may
become a target of a civil RICO claim.

96

See generally 18 U.S.C. §1962(c) (2015).
See Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1349 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Fortney v.
Kuipers, No. 98C5387, 2001 WL 1539143 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2001).
98
Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op. Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1992).
99
Alexander v. Incway Corp., No. CV 11-8851 DSF (VBKX), 2013 WL 5603932, *17
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985).
100
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2015).
101
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496; 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2015).
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18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2015).
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18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2015).
104
18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2015).
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Predicate offenses, such as wire fraud, mail fraud, and other state and
federal crimes, are referred to as racketeering activity by RICO.105 A
“pattern of racketeering activity,” demarcated by as at least two acts of
racketeering activity, marks a distinction from the isolated act.106
Attorneys who commit at least predicate offenses may be subject to a
RICO claim on the basis of a pattern of racketeering.
Fortunately for attorneys, a critical element of any RICO claim is the
last element: proximate causation.107 The most common defense cited by
attorneys who have been charged with civil RICO liability is the absence
of a causal link between the asset protection planning services provided
by the lawyer and the injury suffered by a creditor who was not
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the planning.108 As the Supreme
Court has observed, “At bottom, the notion of proximate cause reflects
‘ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively possible
and convenient.’”109
The proximate cause requirement for civil RICO liability echoes a
similar requirement found in the Sherman and Clayton Acts and is based
on a policy decision to limit liability to instances when the plaintiff
establishes legal causation.110 As the Supreme Court noted, “Here we use
‘proximate cause’ to label generically the judicial tools used to limit a
person’s responsibility for the consequences of that person’s own
acts.”111 According to the Sixth Circuit, monetary loss alone is
insufficient to establish proximate cause.112 Rather, proximate causation
under RICO requires a direct relationship between the injury suffered
and the alleged injurious conduct.113 Thus, the concept of direct injury
refers to the relationship between the injury and the defendant’s actions
and should not be based on the plaintiff’s ability to pay.114 There is also a
requirement that an attorney must be a director or officer of the
enterprise to incur liability.115 Therefore, it follows that an attorney who
simply refers business to an offshore trust company will not fall under
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18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2015).
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2015).
107
See, e.g., Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
108
Id.
109
Id. at 268 (quoting W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and
Keeton on Law of Torts § 41 (5th ed. 1984).
110
Firestone v. Galbreath, 976 F.2d 279, 285 (6th Cir. 1992).
111
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (quoting W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen,
Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 41 (5th ed. 1984).
112
Id.
113
Id. at 259.
114
Firestone, 976 F.2d at 285.
115
See, e.g., Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993).
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the reach of RICO because he is not a director or an officer of the
challenged entity.
Civil RICO claims are wholly inapplicable to the field of asset
protection. Congress enacted RICO with the purpose of eradicating
organized crime.116 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has ruled that
RICO’s far-reaching text should be interpreted narrowly as to not exceed
the Act’s scope.117 Courts should also consider:
[W]hether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his
invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify
exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.118
To permit an extension of RICO into the asset protection planning
sphere distorts the purpose of RICO and invites Congress to curtail its
reach at the expense of those who are legitimate victims of organized
crime.

III.

EMERGING DOCTRINE: THE “PER SE”
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER RULE

Courts increasingly scrutinize the motives of debtors engaged in
asset protection planning. Recent case law reveals the rising challenges
for those exercising the right to protect their wealth and taking
precautionary steps, such as advance planning. The minority approach,
emerging from states like California, finds that when one transfers assets
to protect assets, the transfer is fraudulent under the UFTA as to present
and reasonably foreseeable future creditors, as well as unknown future
creditors.119 This approach raises the fear that residents of minority-view
states cannot engage in asset protection planning whatsoever.

116

H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 245 (1989).
Id.
118
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962)).
119
See, e.g., Kilker v. Stillman, 2012 WL 5902348, *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2012).
See also In re Castellano, supra note 37. It must be noted that this is not the most recent
decision in this case; however, this article was written before the latest decision was
made and the law is still unclear as to whether the asset protection trusts will not be
biased in the bankruptcy context. See Safanda v. Castellano, No. 14 CV 07094, 2015 WL
1911130 (N.D.Ill. April 27, 2015). See also Jay Adkisson, Estate Planning Bar Breathes
Sign of Relief As Castellano Gets Turned Around, FORBES (May 25, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2015/05/25/estate-planning-bar-breathes-sighof-relief-as-castellano-gets-turned-around/#57a02b9d455f.
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In light of California trial and appellate court rulings in Kilker v.
Stillman120 and In re Cutuli,121 the forecast is stacked against domestic
asset protection trusts. Non-DAPT states may choose to ignore the
DAPT structure and the legal rules that protect DAPT assets, whether
using the UFTA or applying the “alter ego” doctrine to disregard the
DAPT.122 In addition, creditors may reach the assets of a DAPT by
relying on the Full Faith and Credit Clause to enforce judgments
obtained against a DAPT in a non-DAPT state.123 In Kilker, a California
court regarded the selection of Nevada asset protection trust laws as the
governing law for a trust settled by a California resident to be per
se fraudulent against future unknown creditors.124 Employing a very
similar rationale, a bankruptcy court in Washington refused to honor the
selection of Alaska DAPT laws to govern a trust established by a resident
of Washington even though no present or known creditors existed at the
time of trust creation.125 Finally, in In re Cutuli, a Florida bankruptcy
court approved the use of a warrant to seize attorney-client
correspondence where the client, a petitioner in bankruptcy, engaged a
law firm which advertised its services in asset protection planning.126 All
three cases present glimpses of how courts remain skeptical of asset
protection planning motives and, in the case of the rulings in Washington
and California, the viability of DAPT planning for residents of nonDAPT states. Responsible practitioners would be wise to consider the
merits of a foreign asset protection trust (“FAPT”) in light of the risks
associated with DAPTs.

A.

Kilker v. Stillman

This unpublished yet critical case signifies perhaps the greatest threat
the domestic asset protection trust industry faces today. Kilker represents
an emerging trend that would functionally impose “strict liability”

120

See Kilker, supra.
In re Cutuli, No. 11-35256-BKC-AJC, 2013 WL 5236711 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept.
16, 2013).
122
See, e.g., Kilker, 2012 WL 5902348 at *6; see also In re Castellano, 514 B.R. at
559-60.
123
See, e.g., IMO Daniel Kloiber Dynasty Trust, No. CIV.A. 9685-VCL, 2014 WL
3924309 (Del. Ch. 2014); U.S. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2; Cf. Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp.
v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 304 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); BNA Portfolio 810-3rd, Asset
Protection Planning, pp. A-53-54.
124
Kilker v. Stillman, 2012 WL 5902348 at *4.
125
In re Huber, 493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013).
126
In re Cutuli, supra note 121.
121
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through a per se fraudulent transfer rule:127 Namely, that planning to
protect assets constitutes “actual intent” to defraud future unforeseen
creditors.128 Technically, the case is non-binding and reflects only a
minority view. One may also quarrel with the appeals court’s reasoning
on choice of law issues. Nevertheless, the court’s rationale in Kilker
sends out the message of disapproval of asset protection.
In 2000, the Kilkers engaged Curcies Coordinated Construction
(“Curcies”) to erect a swimming pool on their land.129 Curcies employed
Stillman to execute soil testing prior to the pool’s construction.130 Based
on Stillman’s report, the pool was built.131 In 2008, the Kilkers filed a
lawsuit against Curcies and Stillman, seeking damages due to a parting in
the mastic seal of the pool.132 The Kilkers settled with Stillman for
$92,500.00.133 After Stillman failed to pay the settled amount, a trial
court in California entered a judgment against Stillman.134
The Kilkers attempted to enforce the judgment by levying on a
property, the Railroad Street property, only to find that the ownership
had been conveyed to an irrevocable trust, the WWG Trust.135 In 2004,
Stillman created a Nevada asset protection trust and transferred most of
his assets into it.136 The Kilkers sought to invalidate Stillman’s original
transfer of the Railroad Street property, claiming that the transfer in trust
was a fraudulent conveyance under the UFTA.137 Stillman attested that,
after the transfers in 2004, he was insolvent and received no
consideration in return for conveying the properties.138 Additionally, he
was blunt in stating that his intention in establishing and funding the trust
was to engage in asset protection planning and shield himself from any
creditors.139 The original trustees of the WWG Trust were employees of

127

Analyzing The Recent Fraudulent Transfer Case of Kilker, ENGEL & REIMAN PC
(Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.engelreiman.com/asset-protection-developments/analyzingthe-recent-fraudulent-transfer-case-of-kilker.
128
See United States v. Townley, 181 F. App’x 630, 631 (9th Cir. 2006) (where the
debtor testified that he transferred assets, hoping to shield them from future creditors.
Such testimony was found to be evidence of fraud. This court’s reasoning would be
consistent with California’s approach.).
129
Kilker, 2012 WL 5902348, at *1.
130
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at *2.
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an accounting firm that helped establish the trust.140 Stillman’s brother
was the sole trust beneficiary.141 Throughout the history of the trust,
Stillman regularly used the assets of the trust to cover his personal
expenses, including cell phone and credit card bills, personal attorney
fees, XM radio bills, and newspaper subscriptions.142
The trial court ruled for the Kilkers, invalidating the transfer in trust
based on Stillman’s testimony that he intended to hinder future
unforeseen creditors by setting up the Nevada trust.143 The court also
found that the WWG Trust was the “alter ego” of Stillman, as the trust
was used by Stillman as a personal pocketbook for so many years.144 The
key to the trial court’s ruling, which was upheld on appeal, was a novel
interpretation of California UFTA section 3439.04(a), which provides:
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is
fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim
arose before or after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer
or incurred the obligation as follows: (1) With actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor. (2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent
value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the
debtor either: (A) Was engaged or was about to engage
in a business or a transaction for which the remaining
assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation
to the business or transaction. (B) Intended to incur, or
believed or reasonably should have believed that he or
she would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as
they became due.145
The trial court found the Kilkers to be “reasonably foreseeable”
creditors, despite the fact that their claim arose four years after the
establishment of the trust and eight years after Stillman had produced the
report that gave rise to the cause of action.146 The court reasoned that
because soil engineers are frequently sued, all customers of a soil
engineer constitute reasonably foreseeable future creditors.147
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On appeal, the reviewing court upheld the finding of a fraudulent
transfer by interpreting the UFTA broadly.148 Even though section
3439.04(a) does not reference future creditors, the appeals court
extended the meaning of creditor to include any creditor, both present
and future.149 The appeals court eliminated any distinction between
known or reasonably foreseeable creditors and future unknown
creditors.150
By interpreting the statute to protect future unforeseen creditors, the
appeals court then needed to decide whether the prior transfer in trust of
the Railroad Street property was a fraudulent transfer at the time it was
made.151 The court considered evidence that Stillman’s actual intent was
to defraud his “creditors,” including the fact that he was insolvent
following the transfer in trust, had received no consideration in exchange
for the transfer in trust, and continued to exercise control over the trust
assets following the transfer.152 The California court treated such facts as
proof of “actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the
debtor.”153
Stillman contended that because the WWG Trust had been
established under Nevada law, the issue of a fraudulent transfer should
have been determined under Nevada law.154 Furthermore, Stillman
argued that Nevada’s domestic asset protection trust laws protected such
transfers against claims from future unknown creditors, and his retained
powers over the trust were permitted under Nevada law.155 The
California court did not engage in a conflict of laws discussion and
simply pointed out that Nevada’s UFTA must be interpreted the same
way in Nevada due to the identical verbiage of the UFTA, which was
meant to achieve uniformity among the states in regard to the law of
fraudulent transfers.156 Because the UFTA in both California and Nevada
contained similar wording, the appeals court determined that a Nevada
court would inevitably reach the same conclusion as the trial court in
California, to wit, evidence of actual intent to avoid future creditors
constituted a fraudulent transfer under the UFTA.157
California courts blatantly disregarded the very premise of Nevada’s
asset protection trust laws ratifying such structures for general asset
148
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150
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protection purposes. Asset protection trust laws in Nevada would
generally cut off creditor claims two years after any transfer in trust.
California, however, does not have asset protection trust laws, giving rise
to a direct conflict of laws that was not addressed by the court in this
case.
The better approach would have been that the UFTA only protects
known or reasonably foreseeable creditors and not unforeseen future
creditors. This interpretation of the UFTA would arguably yield the same
result in cases brought in both asset protection trust states, such as
Nevada, and those states that do not confer any particular asset protection
trust benefits, like California. If the California court were correct, it
would be impossible to have any asset protection trust in Nevada. While
the California appellate court relied on the underlying purpose of the
UFTA,158 the court should have simultaneously looked into the purpose
of asset protection trust laws enacted in Nevada.
Unfortunately for residents of California and other non-DAPT states,
the choice of law issue is not critical to the creditor’s fraudulent transfer
argument.159 By applying the “alter ego” doctrine, the Kilker ruling
provides an avenue whereby creditors may sidestep uncomfortable
questions regarding choice of law. Instead, a finding under local law that
the trust is a sham frees the court to disregard Nevada domestic asset
protection trust law completely. After all, if the trust does not exist, there
is no context by which Nevada law applies.
Those in the DAPT industry in Nevada and other states ignore the
Kilker ruling by pointing to the unpublished status of the appeals court’s
ruling, or the mea culpa delivered by Stillman in his deposition.
However, it is folly to ignore the significant threat imposed by Kilker.
Asset protection attorneys would better serve their clients by considering
the impact of this ruling and evaluate alternate structures and
jurisdictions for planning.
The sad irony is that Stillman would have been better served by
wasting his assets. By disclosing that he had tried to preserve his wealth,
Stillman set himself up to be punished. The Kilker ruling places residents
of California in a permanently disadvantaged position compared to
residents of the sixteen states that have enacted DAPT laws.
Notwithstanding precedent allowing the disposition of property in the
absence of claims and creditors, the healthy distinction between (i)
present foreseeable creditors and (ii) future unknown creditors appears to
have evaporated in some non-DAPT states, like California. In addition to
158
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protecting creditors’ rights, courts should weigh other factors as a matter
of public policy, including the rights of people to know where their
liability begins and where it ends.
As the security of property ownership declines,
investments flee and the economic environment becomes
unstable, no one wants to invest where earning will be
heavily taxed, or even the possibility of direct
confiscation on the allegation of having violated a
plethora of unknowable, unobservable laws.160
Arguably, the Kilkers should not have been permitted to bring claims
that dated back eight years. Statutes of limitations exist to draw a line at
some point and cut off liability, giving people certainty and predictability
in the law. Individuals should not feel threatened to spend their savings
on desired commodities because some potential creditor may have a
claim against them eight years later. Otherwise, rational people may
avoid becoming soil engineers, like Stillman, and steer clear of
occupations that incur frequent litigation. Courts in non-DAPT states
may eventually demand mandatory reserves for the relief of
unforeseeable creditors.
Stillman may have sought protection of his wealth,161 but his
formulation of intent was oversimplified, which prejudiced the outcome.
His desire to preserve his wealth was equated with an intent to defraud
future creditors. By finding his planning as constituting a fraudulent
transfer, even as to future unforeseen creditors, the California appeals
court took away a valuable property right previously found to exist at
law. After all, in 1861, the Supreme Court properly conferred the timing
of when creditors are allowed to exercise their rights:
Our laws determine with accuracy the time and manner
in which the property of a debtor ceases to be subject to
his deposition, and becomes subject to the rights of his
creditor. A creditor acquires a lien upon the lands of his
debtor by a judgment; and upon the personal goods of
the debtor, by the delivery of an execution to the sheriff.
It is only by these liens that a creditor has any vested or
specific right in the property of his debtor. Before these
liens are acquired, the debtor has full dominion over his
property; he may convert one species of the property
160
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into another, and he may alienate to a purchaser. The
rights of the debtor, and those of a creditor, are thus
defined by positive rules; and the points at which the
power of the debtor ceases, and the right of the creditor
commences, are clearly established. These regulations
cannot be contravened or varied by any interposition of
equity.162

B.

In re Huber

Another case prejudiced against asset protection arose out of a
Washington bankruptcy court and its decision to decline applying the
asset protection trust laws of Alaska to the transfers made in trust by a
resident of Washington.163 The rationale behind this bankruptcy court’s
decision foreshadows a trend of hostility toward asset protection trusts
settled by residents of states that do not recognize asset protection
trusts.164 The Huber ruling offers a glimpse into understanding similar
California and Washington state court rulings that disregard transfers
into self-settled spendthrift trusts.
Donald G. Huber worked in real estate development and
management for 40 years.165 His customers ranged from individual
homebuyers to large builders.166 In the typical deal, Huber used a
corporation or limited liability company to direct his investment in the
project, often owning the entire project through the business entity.167
Huber also served as a personal guarantor on loans advanced by banks to
entities in which he was a principal.168
According to the bankruptcy examiner in the case, Huber must have
known about the “gathering storm clouds” that were about to hit the real
estate industry in late 2007 and early 2008.169 In 2008, Huber settled an
Alaskan spendthrift trust and conveyed almost all of his assets into the
trust.170 As revealed in subsequent discovery, emails among Huber, his
son, and his estate planning attorney indicated that the sole purpose of
the trust was to “protect a portion of assets from creditors.”171 The emails
also conveyed a significant degree of urgency in setting up the trust.
162
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In 2011, Huber filed for bankruptcy and, in 2012, the bankruptcy
trustee sought to invalidate the Alaskan spendthrift trust, claiming that
Huber had transferred assets to the trust in violation of sections 548(e)(1)
and 544(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.172 At trial, Huber contended
that he had transferred his assets to the trust at a time when there were no
claims or known creditors.173 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court found
that Huber had constructive knowledge of potential creditors and an
awareness of the distinct likelihood that he would be unable to repay his
creditors following the transfers to the trust.174 Accordingly, the
bankruptcy court found a fraudulent transfer under both state law and
section 548(e) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.175 Additionally, by finding a
fraudulent transfer to a self-settled spendthrift trust, the bankruptcy court
invoked the 10-year clawback rule of section 548(e)(1) of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, requiring all transfers from the debtor to the trust for
the ten-year period preceding the bankruptcy filing to be included in the
bankruptcy estate.176
The bankruptcy trustee originally asked that the court nullify the
trust under the laws of Washington, notwithstanding that the trust had
been formed under the laws of Alaska.177 The bankruptcy court
addressed the conflict of laws issue by first turning to the Restatement on
Conflicts of Laws.178 Under the reasoning of the Restatement, the choice
of Alaska law would be sustained if Alaska had an extensive relation to
the trust. Restatement section 270(a), comment b, provides that:
[A] state has a substantial relation to a trust if at the time
the trust is created: (1) the trustee or settlor is domiciled
in the state; (2) the assets are located in the state; and (3)
the beneficiaries are domiciled in the state. These
contacts with the state are not exclusive.179
Huber did not reside in Alaska, the trust assets were not located in
Alaska, and none of the beneficiaries were residents of Alaska.180 Only
one of the trustees resided in Alaska, and the trust was administered in
Alaska.181
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By comparison, the bankruptcy court found that Washington has a
robust public policy barring the use of self-settled spendthrift trusts.182
Explicitly, transfers to self-settled spendthrift trusts are invalidated if
made for the purpose of avoiding present or future creditors of the
settlor.183 According to the bankruptcy court, this view is consistent
among the vast majority of states.184 In support of this observation, the
court referred to the oft-cited case of Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy,
in which a bankruptcy court reflected on New York’s public policy
disapproving the use of self-settled trusts.185
The bankruptcy court accordingly chose to apply Washington law to
determine the validity of the trust and transfers to the trust.186 The court
considered each of the badges of fraud at the time Huber funded his trust,
focusing specifically on the following badges of fraud: (1) Real or
upcoming litigation; (2) an unsubstantiated transfer of most of the
debtor’s property; (3) insolvency or other indebtedness of the debtor; (4)
a distinct relationship between the debtor and the transferee; and, after
the transfer, (5) retaining control of the assets transferred by the
debtor.187 The bankruptcy court found five badges of fraud.188 The court
also concluded that Huber had acted out of a desire to protect his
wealth.189 Huber proclaimed that he had established the trust for estate
planning purposes, but the court found that the circumstances and timing
of the formation of the trust, along with the assets transferred into the
trust, revealed his true motive: asset protection.190
The bankruptcy trustee argued that Huber was motivated by the
corrupt pursuit of asset protection.191 Huber failed to properly articulate
sound arguments in his own defense. Nevertheless, the rationale of the
bankruptcy court in Huber comes as no surprise when compared with the
ruling in Kilker: If asset protection planning is identified as the primary
motive for the transfers undertaken by the debtor, modern courts are
inclined to grant relief to the creditor. While the decision in Huber may
be limited to those circumstances in which a debtor avoids present
creditors or guarantors, Kilker illustrates that even unknown future
creditors may be able to challenge transfers in trust.
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In re Cutuli

In re Cutuli is one of those bad cases involving bad actors and
bad facts, giving asset protection planning a bad reputation. The parties
in this case intentionally sought to hide assets, employing all possible
means to defraud a judgment creditor.192 The actions of the debtor in
Cutuli serve as a vivid example of how not to engage in asset protection
planning. As explained below, the debtor should have never been
assisted by the attorneys in her case.
The debtor, Kathleen Smith-Cutuli (“Smith”), had been a partner in a
winery business, Napa Smith Brewery & Winery, LLC, for 17 years with
“Elie.”193 Their partnership ended in 2005, when their joint business was
sold.194 Litigation ensued between the two thereafter, and Elie obtained a
judgment against Smith in August 2009, for roughly $6 million.195
Rather than waving the white flag and giving up to Elie whatever
funds she had left, Smith decided to take a different, much more
aggressive course of action.196 The scheme that she concocted with the
assistance of California counsel involved several steps.197 First, Smith
entered into a pre-marital agreement with her fiancé, Cutuli, that made
clear that each of them would maintain their pre-marital assets and
liabilities separate of each other once they married.198 Next, Cutuli
brought a quiet title action against Smith relating to real estate located in
California.199 Smith declined to wage any form of defense, and Cutuli
obtained a $10 million default judgment against his fiancé.200 In the
intervening period between the execution of the pre-marital agreement
and Cutuli obtaining the default judgment, Elie sued Smith in a
California court and procured a judgment against her on the $6 million
debt.201 As Elie prepared to collect on his judgment, Smith transferred
her assets to Cutuli, supposedly to satisfy Cutuli’s judgment against
Smith.202
When Elie conducted discovery to try and collect on his judgment,
Elie learned that Smith and Cutuli had worked in concert to transfer
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assets as part of Cutuli’s judgment against Smith.203 Smith left
California, failing to respond to the ongoing proceedings in Elie’s action
and incurring a bench warrant for her arrest.204 In a novel move, Elie
brought a claim for abuse of process in California against Smith, Cutuli,
and the attorney who had advised them on the quiet title action.205 The
essence of Elie’s complaint was that the quiet title action had been
fraudulently obtained and was intended as a ruse to hide Smith’s assets
from Elie.206
In September 2011, Smith, who had relocated to Florida with Cutuli,
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy.207 Smith and Cutuli hired a law
firm of “asset protection experts,” the Andersen Firm, and one of their
attorneys, Matt Harrod, to help further their ambitious scheme.208 Harrod
recommended the formation of a Wyoming LLC with an offshore bank
account in the Isle of Man.209
Back in California, the evidence of fraudulent transfers unveiled by
the court was overwhelming.210 Weeks after learning of the original
California judgment, Smith had transferred three luxury vehicles to her
fiancé, valued at over $300,000.211 Smith and Cutuli also took out a
mortgage of $1 million against their real estate.212 The quiet title action
was found to be a bogus attempt to hide assets.213 The California court
ruled in favor of Elie and further awarded treble damages against Smith
and her cohorts.214 The court further ordered that Smith’s and Cutuli’s
assets be held in a constructive trust pending Elie’s collection of the
awards.215
When news of the California action reached the attention of the
bankruptcy court in Florida, the bankruptcy court issued a warrant to
seize Smith and Cutuli’s books, records, and computers, including email
correspondence with the Andersen Firm and Harrod. Cutuli challenged
the warrant on grounds of privileged attorney-client communications.
However, the court sustained the warrant on the basis that the prima
facie record called for application of the crime fraud exception to
203
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attorney-client privilege. The bankruptcy court focused on the fact that
the debtor had hired a law firm that promoted its services in asset
protection planning, as it was considered evidence of bad intent.
As a result of an accumulation of critically poor decisions, Smith,
Cutuli, and their Florida attorneys were now looking at potential
bankruptcy fraud—a crime—for having conducted Wyoming and
offshore asset protection planning. This is in addition to the treble
damages Smith, Cutuli, and their California counsel faced from the
bogus quiet title action back in California.
At this point, Cutuli should be contrasted with Kilker: The debtor in
Cutuli acted with actual intent to defraud known creditors, whereas the
debtor in Kilker was acting consistent with the DAPT laws of Nevada
well ahead of any reasonably foreseeable creditors. The “asset
protection” planning conducted by the attorneys in Cutuli was not legal
planning but rather a fraudulent attempt to hide assets. By comparison,
debtors such as in Kilker are generally transparent in their planning,
intending to rely on the protections afforded under DAPT or FAPT laws,
not the creditor’s inability to locate debtor assets.
While the debtor in Cutuli was assessed treble damages, one should
not conclude that this outcome would apply in other cases involving
fraudulent transfers. The sizable punitive damages were awarded based
on a finding of common law fraud alongside the fraudulent transfers
made by the debtor: “[A] far-reaching scheme to defraud creditors
including findings of ‘actual’ or ‘intentional’ as well as ‘constructive’
fraud.”216 Had the debtor not conspired to file the sham quiet title action,
the creditor’s claims might have been more strictly limited to those
remedies afforded under the UFTA.
Competent counsel would caution a client engaged in asset
protection planning to consider the consequences if the client later files
for bankruptcy. Inevitably, the bankruptcy court will learn of the asset
protection planning and deny the debtor a discharge. Worse, the debtor
may learn that asset protection planning pursued in contemplation of an
imminent bankruptcy filing, or following a bankruptcy filing, may entail
criminal prosecution of the debtor for bankruptcy fraud.

IV.

BUILDING THE BETTER CASE FOR ASSET
PROTECTION

The common theme running through the rulings in Kilker, Huber,
and Cutuli is the court’s intense focus on asset protection motives
216
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underlying the debtor’s actions. This raises an important question: Does
the presence of an asset protection motive profoundly affect the outcome
of the case? Recent case law indicates that a finding of an asset
protection motive on the part of the debtor is a significant factor, if not
the determining factor, in considering whether the court will honor the
debtor’s planning arrangements or disregard them entirely.

A.

“Integrated”217 and Vigilant Estate Planning

As recent case law indicates, early planning may not be enough in
certain jurisdictions like California.218 Factors such as the solvency of the
debtor, the presence of one or more badges of intent, and whether any
consideration is received in exchange for the debtor’s assets will be
scrutinized on an ad hoc basis.219
At a minimum, attorneys advising clients in asset protection planning
should conduct thorough due diligence on the solvency of their clients.220
The lawyer should request financial statements, preferably prepared by a
certified public accountant, detailing the client’s net worth and cash
flow.221 In addition, the lawyer should obtain an affidavit of solvency
from the prospective client confirming the facts surrounding any existing
or potential liabilities.222
In addition to obtaining a client’s signed affidavits and statements,
proper due diligence dictates that the attorney should not rely on such
representations alone but should verify the client’s financial records with
third party sources. Recording Internet search records—or the absence
thereof—helps to reinforce records produced by the client and referees.
Attorneys should preserve records describing the facts of any case in
which the lawyer declines to represent the potential client.223
Attorneys may consider focusing on those client goals for which
asset protection is an incidental benefit the better approach to modern
asset protection planning. For example, a client without an estate plan
may benefit from having a will and trust prepared.224 At the same time,
the lawyer should ensure that the memoranda and file records prepared in
the course of the representation demonstrate a genuine need for estate
planning benefits. If a trust is put in place to minimize estate taxes, one
should expect to see an estate the size of which would be subject to an
217
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estate tax absent such planning, along with a file memorandum
identifying the estate tax savings goals to be served through the plan.

B.

Alternatives to Gifting

Asset protection trusts have the capacity to be the victims of their
own success. Any time the creditor is told that no assets are available to
satisfy a debt, it forces the creditor to find other ways to attack the asset
protection structure and undermine the trust planning. If the Kilker
decision is followed by other states, it is fair to say that asset protection
trusts will have reached a tipping point, with creditors gaining the upper
hand in both state and federal bankruptcy courts.
While trusts have been used to sever legal and beneficial ownership
for centuries, there are more modern vehicles for achieving many of the
same benefits, such as planning structures that confer valuable asset
protection benefits, including captive insurance,225 limited liability
companies, and foreign investment funds. These modern alternatives to
the common law trust primarily serve important business purposes while
incidentally conferring asset protection benefits that rival or, in some
cases, surpass those of an asset protection trust. More importantly, such
structures owe their success to the arm’s length nature of transfers made
into such structures, which are less gratuitous and suspect than transfers
made in trust.

1. Captive Insurance
Captive insurance is a strategic planning alternative by which an
insurance company assumes the property and casualty risks of a related
business.226 Born out of the need to secure reinsurance for large steel
mills, captive insurance exploded in popularity as insureds learned to
manage their insurance claims and capture profits from underwriting
their own business activities. In addition, captive insurance enables a
business to obtain the full spectrum of coverage, including protection
against cyberfraud, reputational risk, and business interruption that are
not readily available in the commercial marketplace at reasonable rates,
without excessive limitations or exclusions in coverage.227
A central tenet of captive insurance planning is that premium
payments made by the insured business to the captive insurance company
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for insurance coverage must be at arm’s length.228 If the insured business
manages its claims experience to minimize payouts, the profits
accumulated inside the captive insurance company constitute a
significant wealth transfer from the operating business to the captive
insurance company.229 This is particularly useful if the operating business
incurs higher than normal risks in its operations or accumulates
significant cash.
Captive insurance offers important asset protection benefits.230 First,
when a business purchases insurance coverage from a captive, insurance
premiums flow from the business to the captive to pay for that insurance
coverage. Those premium dollars are no longer in the business, where
they might otherwise be exposed to creditor claims. Instead, those
premium dollars now belong to the captive.231 This can be analogized to
severing legal and beneficial ownership in a trust setting: while legal
ownership of funds used to pay premiums shift from the operating
business to the captive, the beneficial ownership remains with the owner
of the captive, who, most often, owns the operating business.
When the captive insurance company is formed, consideration
should be given to the ownership structure of the captive. For example,
if an individual becomes an owner of a captive, then that ownership
interest is a personal asset of the individual. By comparison, if that same
individual created an asset protection trust to take on ownership of the
captive, the individual’s creditors may have limited or no recourse
against the assets of the trust.232 The funds accumulated inside the
captive reflect earned income from underwriting activities, depriving
creditors of the opportunity to pursue a gratuitous transfer from the
business owner to the captive or its trust owner.
Third, captive insurance companies are most often established
offshore, although an increasing number are formed domestically.233
Many offshore jurisdictions that are popular for captive insurance
planning are also well-known asset protection jurisdictions, such as
Belize and Nevis.234 A creditor pursuing premium payments made to a
captive must prove that premium payments were not at arm’s length; the
creditor must also accomplish this in a foreign legal setting with different
rules, under an English “loser pays” rule for legal expenses, and with a
228
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bond requirement to gain access to the courthouse in many
jurisdictions.235
At the same time, asset protection benefits rarely drive the captive
insurance market. Captive insurance is premised on the benefits that can
be achieved by managing claims and conserving premium income that
otherwise might be lost to a third-party carrier. These financial benefits
are magnified if ownership of the operating business belongs to the older
generation of family members and the captive belongs to the younger
generation; properly structured, wealth may shift transfer tax free from
one generation to the next.236
The benefits of captive insurance may be compounded because of
important tax savings realized in the operating business in the form of
premium expense deductions, as well as the manner in which the captive
insurance company recognizes income for tax purposes.237 Smaller
captive insurance companies may even enjoy an exemption on up to $1.2
million238 of premium income under current law.239
Under Section 831(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, a small captive
insurance company that collects no more than $1.2 million in premium
may elect exemption from corporate income tax on insurance income.240
Instead, the small captive is only taxed on its non-insurance income, such
as dividends, capital gains, and interest income.241 These benefits must
be balanced against the increased tax cost of investment income realized
inside the captive, including capital gains, which do not enjoy a reduced
rate of tax.242
Captives are taxable as C corporations, which do not enjoy as many
graduated tax brackets as individuals.243 Additionally, the owners of the
captive incur corporate- and shareholder-lever taxation on the
distribution of appreciated property, as well as a tax liability on cash
235
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dividends.244 Finally, liquidating a captive may incur taxes for both the
captive and its shareholders. While the tax savings of a captive may not
be overwhelming, the after-tax profits captured through a successfully
managed captive insurance company provide compelling non-asset
protection reasons to implement a captive insurance company.245

2. LLCs
In addition to captive insurance companies, asset protection
planners widely utilize limited liability companies (“LLCs”) as an
alternative to a traditional DAPT.246 The limited liability company is
perhaps the most popular form of business entity in use today. LLCs are
formed for the purpose of engaging in a wide variety of activities, from
pursuing an active, operating business to pooling assets as part of a
common investment strategy.
First introduced in Wyoming in 1977,247 LLC statutes now exist in
all fifty states and many foreign jurisdictions. Built upon important
concepts from partnership, limited partnership, and corporate law, many
states have taken significant steps to help ensure that LLCs have the best
of everything that business entity law has to offer.248
Asset protection benefits derive from the legal relationship between
the LLC and its members.249 Members contribute to the capital of an
LLC in exchange for the equivalent value in the form of a membership
interest issued by the LLC.250 Capital and income inside the LLC are
generally shielded from interference by an outside creditor, who may be
limited in many jurisdictions to a charging order remedy against a
debtor-member’s LLC interest.251 The charging order is akin to a wage
garnishment, only entitling the creditor to receive distributions if and
when made voluntarily by the LLC to its members.252 LLCs are viable
and rather efficacious alternatives to asset protection trusts that erect
firewalls against unanticipated future creditors.

244

Id.
Engel, supra note 8 at 755.07-755.08.
246
BNA Portfolio 810-3rd, Asset Protection Planning, pp. A-57.
247
Richard M. Horwood & Jeffrey A. Hechtman, The Better Alternative: The Limited
Liability Company, 20 J. OF REAL EST. TAX’N 348, 22-24 (1993).
248
Engel, supra note 8 at 890.01.
249
Richard M. Guerard, Asset Protection Planning: An Important Resource For Clients
in Difficult Times, DCBA BRIEF (February 2011), available at http://www.dcba.org/mpag
e/vol230211art2.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id.
245

2015-2016]

EMERGING CHALLENGES

173

3. Foreign Investment Funds
One may consider foreign investment funds, as they offer a solid
alternative to asset protection trusts.253 By pursuing an international
investment opportunity not available in the client’s home jurisdiction, or
where the debtor cannot directly participate, such as Regulation S
offerings, a client may attain asset protection benefits while also
experiencing financial benefits from the investment fund.254
Many foreign investment funds prohibit transfers of ownership
interests to third parties and limit redemption requests as to timing and
amount.255 Creditors in the United States may be prohibited from gaining
any interest in a fund that has offered interests under the Regulation S
exemption.256 Many of the common forms of creditor limitations
applicable to LLCs also apply to foreign investment funds, many of
which are organized as LLCs: Creditors may be limited to a charging
order against an investor’s interest, and creditors are normally denied the
ability to demand redemptions or interfere with management of the
investment fund.257 A combination of these factors may have the effect of
reducing the perceived value of the investment interest in the eyes of the
creditor.

V.

CONCLUSION

Asset protection planning has become a hot topic at national legal
conferences and occupies an entire industry of attorneys. Yet, case law
over the years has enshrouded this important area of practice in a fog.
Estate planning attorneys are simply incapable of giving complete legal
advice to their clients without evaluating the need for asset protection. As
more states enact DAPT laws, the risk of inconsistent consequences from
asset protection planning and fraudulent transfers among states increases.
Responsible social policy and sound legal principles require that
attorneys and their clients be able to engage in asset protection planning,
253
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even if planning means that future unanticipated creditors may be denied
access to client assets. At the same time, residents of non-DAPT states
may be denied the same planning opportunities as residents of DAPT
states. Attorneys engaged in asset protection planning in non-DAPT
states should therefore explore the use of alternative planning techniques
where asset protection is an incidental benefit rather than the primary
planning objective served by the structure.

